Thursday, May 10, 2012

Inn the Hearth off Mediation: Tropiod Transsupracrossbeyondness (Part Two)



Basher:  I could not sympathize more with the weary fella…But my frustration is of a different character. To be more precise, I’ve been stigmatized as an arrogantly ignorant, badly-styled offender of everybody and everything else--sometimes intentionally, at times inexplicably misreading their words, emotions, and thoughts. Here it’s worth mentioning that I moved to this country as an adult and, for that reason, was more familiar with acquisition of language than with learning it…In any case, the point I’m trying to make is that such a situation made of me a handicapped person forever excluded from the club of indigenous lovers of a good laugh. You may wonder why.  I’d hardly swallow the last bite of my favorite cookie and the lightening ’ld hit you, opening your eyes to the sad truth that the reason is another form of deprivation: (in this particular case)  of the ability (mind you, not the right!) to enjoy the benefits of good pun. One does what one can…some things are just to be accepted. That’s sad destiny of a non-native speaker, innit? Going back to the theme of accusation, I must admit that it’s not so hard, though, to bear the stigma…as it is to explain that all the guilt results from my inability to either remember or understand my own history. Why? You may want to know. Rightly so. Because it is written at once, starting and ending in a zerolike statement. What could be more bewildering? How to think of geography shaped by such history? How to know one’s own date of birth? How to produce a decent epigraph? How to learn the alphabet that includes numbers? How to count when the first and the last number in the string are zerolike? How not to be weary? I’m asking you.
Truly moving…Puts my lousy verbal capacities to shame. In such situations I always turn to what has already been said about the topic in question. Many people have articulated thoughts about it much better than I can. Furthermore, as someone who suffers from the same ocassional memory blocks, I usually slip into other people’s diaries because, if nothing else, they keep exact record of time. I even tend to stick to a sample and take it as a recuring pattern of my own thinking. Here’s one of them…Stay tuned to WELD/Program. Awm.




Medical Profession: I’m honored to be part of this remix. My only concern is (how astonishingly in tune with the sentiment of your recurring diarist pattern, me-ms-ess-ta--DJ …sadly so)…anxiety some would dub it…that there is little I can contribute to it. My imagination is inhibited, my mind operates at a pace normally associated with the kinetics of lower species such as snails…my spirit is crippled, my vocabulary repetitive, limited…my ideas uninteresting, my heart hollow, my soul shallow, and my body…nonexisting. When I think about the ways that might…perhaps reanimate my being, transforming me into a potential contributor, I see no way…All I see is an indigo world, spreading a curtain over the roof of the Milky Way. It’s a dripping world. What from here looks, or, may be imagined as either an atmosphere or vacuum is, actually, a rich blue ocean. When I am not engaged in devising tactics for reanimating my slumberous soul, I am a surfer — a rider of ultramarine oceanic waves. When I come back from across the curtain divide, I bring on my torso ink droplets. I don’t wash them away. Instead, I let them dry…Slowly. It’s a dripping world. I don’t know how long it takes for one micropond to evaporate from my skin, but while it’s happening, I am not more alive than I was before I went surfing. That makes me think that surfing is not quite the best reanimating tactics. I spent many an hour brining people back to life. I’m a doctor. But I need another fella-of-the-trade to recreate me. My name is Alle. If there’s anybody among the participants worthy of the title, please find my contact info on http://www.WELD/Program. Awm and DO NOT hesitate to get in touch.
Working Class Standpoint: I was patient enough, waiting to see if there would be light at the end of the tunnel…of this infinitely nonsensical logorrhea. You either have no philosophical gift, or, you are so hopelessly in love with being manipulated by plagiarizing your own thoughts. No wonder you live your life like s*it when the content of your “philosophizing” is platitudes. Not that it’s not worth thinking once in a while, but how you do it certainly does not problematize it in a way sufficiently inspiring to be food for other philosophers (proper at that!!!). Also, your poetic potential is on the level and of the scope of a three year old child. “Damp leaves,” “window pane,” curtains everywhere…milk galore…life of ultramarine affinities…drizzling…dripping…dr…NO BIG DEAL!!! I am a businessman. I work. Have neither time no inclination for kindergarten poetry and chicken-brain theory. I work. Do YOU?




Stupid Perspective: I don’t. I’m a rascal. An edgy bastard. A provoking poseur. I pose a lot. I take no opinion as well-intended advice. I find it offensive when my pose is criticized for being too provocative. Then I become vengeful. Blood-thirsty. I take no offence. I will have no novice telling me what style is. I’m bad-styling. And I bite. Back. Now, YOU, Mr. Busy…were you talking to me? Wait for your response I shall not. Rather, I’d revenge right-da-phunkie way. You scum…bad-styling you call me…HUH???!!!! Feel free to find my contact info on http://www.WELD/Program. Awm and DO NOT hesitate to get in phunkie touch, so we can “TALK” OFF phunkie line!!! Poets of desire, philosophers of architecture, painters of replicas, walking bulls, sitting foots, photographers of time, salesmen of other people’s grandparents, couch-comforters…you know where you can find me. Don’t let me wait too long to taste the odd droplet from your jugular…CHEERIO!!!

Domestic Perspective: Anybody in need of style cramping? I have no hope that theory can ever be improved as long as it is writ in ink. Desolate and overpowered I AM faced with the bleakness of the conversation. Truly discouraging. A kind of revenge as disparaging may be, I am deeply ashamed by the vulgarity of your motives, me dear participants. Not that I expected noble spirits among you. Can’t even say that my aspirations reached any height…I never had a slightest trace of a thought that compassion could be at stake. But this is below the lowest threshold of dignity.

Scholarly Perspective:

Education It’s the school days that turned out to be the greatest source of inspiration for such a sudden urge to re-enact the state rather different from what one knows now. For one, there was no need to worry about tuition fees. But then, neither was it there when one was in college. How strangely mutably-invariable. In comparison to what it is now. Anyway, not having to be concerned about mindbending  maneuvering in order to make ends meet and still get some education, one was pretty much disburdened and could navigate the lifescape with astoundingly immense (for some characters) ease.


one was frequently asked: what is thy phunkie problem going to be? one would answer: oronot. one was again asked: how do thou imagine thy future career-phunkie-job? one would answer: dunno the difference between ye idea and ye yeme. one was told: how do thou think thou sceolde live if thou has no vision of site? one would answer: don’t give a s*it about your introgation. one was told: that’s not how people speak—thou spake no good runian poetry. one would respond: don’t care how you say *sameGAbri* in etruscan; ich says *bite this one lucky Bastard*


On more than one occasion one would be challenged to defend the provocativeness of  the jungle-mess which sometimes passed for essays. One would answer: All the power that anyone can ascribe to destabilizing techniques does and does not exist at the same time; all the power attached to the effect of the demand for plausibility melts like towers of dust on a sandy beach when confronted with the dispeller of the approximately following context: ich been the creatore in possession of a bottomless  wellspring of mindless bulls*iteering—incomprehensibly incomprehendable at that. One was secretly pitied for having such murky prospects ahead of oneself.
One was a lucky bastard. And so were a couple of similar characters in one’s class, V.



Work More than once, one was either accused/condemned of, or, fired because of seriously threatening  the existence of a considerable number of people and students. If what has just been said sounds  to you like a chant coming from a deranged shamanistic liver at noon of an August day in Sahara, it is because there is an insurmountable problem with translating lexical meaning of etrurian phonology into the morphology of any language imaginable to a human kidney. If not, who cares…In any case, such a professional history presents, or, more precisely, could present an impediment to one’s successfully climbing the social ladder—!upwards! Alternately, one gets hired at the institute for queer-twisting remixology of retro-fungi under the auspices of the society for damage-minded saharian thinkers amusing themselves with enchanting sand in the interregnum between two beaches at the tower. Lucky bastard.

: :Cheers! Honorable listeners / participators, we are going to take a short break and hear from our correspondent who is conveying heated discussions currently partaking at the friendly battlefield of ideas on Half Floral Avenue. Yo!

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

Inn the Hearth off Mediation: Tropiod Transsupracrossbeyondness (Part One)


1 On Air: Take One

 :Welcome back  to 1000 FM. You are listening to WELD/Program. Awm.  This is your DJ NNY speaking. It is Friday. 9:40 AM and you are tuned just phunkie right. This is the Program. Keep sipping at your iced tea, while the gentle rhythm floats through the waves from this turntable straight to your homes, suckaz! And whilst rocking to the swaying beat, feel free to move your lazy ass and pick up the cell phone lying next to the bed on which you are decomposing, immersed in the slumber of the heart. Take that phunkie device, press all the right buttons, and you will soon hear a husky, yet melliferous voice that will enrich your dull day with even a lamer conversation. But all is not in what is said…unowadamsayin, hu? So, yeah…put some phunkie muscular effort and grab the phone. Talk to ME…Hello?

Yeah…

/ Whassup!

 : Sure…I call to proclaim strong and irrevocable disbelief in science, thereby shattering the myth of religion and altogether dismissing the notion of faith. Bless!
:Fierce, dude! Care to say something about your anxious self? Hello? Um…Looks like the conversation was just what you’ve heard…But…hullo! Who’s there?

V: More Air
: Awrajt… I am here. HowboutYOU?

Long time, bro…Just callin to address the issue previously raised by one of the acquantices…Not that tis a reply…more like a comment or something…


Go ahead…


Sure… Having recovered from the shock of shattered faith, I now live in the world in which myth is not possible, dreams are nothing but elegant devices for passing from one psychedelic to another tranCelike state, vectors do not connect two points, tangentiality does not imply the spot of contact, the body is what you write about it, mother is that who has no womb, and father is the fable one creates dashing through caleidoscpoic corridors…Are you with me?


Head to toes…


Having said that, I am now free to behead you on a basis of the premise claiming that I am the hand on your turntable, happily leaving you with an illusion that you host the Program. Furthermore, I am free to actually be that hand and immerse myself in the beauty of the fact that I am telling you a true story. Needless to say, I am also free to believe that it can leave you somewhat puzzled, but that will—and cannot!—affect the way I live in the postmythical world. Under no bloody circumstances (and/or conditions for that matter!) shall I abandon the safety of the new world with no boundaries and no hosts!


I sure will not interfere with your idea of safety, truth be told…


You shouldn’t! Because not only does it provide ME, but also YOU with an opportunity to indulge in the escalation of good, boundless friendship…What is more, my sense is that (if properly appropriated) the newly arisen situation can (and MUST!) lead towards unprecedented imaginary possibilities. This is where my atavistic mind gets halted and I continue to be free…free to be lonely…Nobody can deprive me of that liberty…Liberty to love a thought of who you are…To talk to you, all the while keeping to myself. If I so desire. And I do. So, see…I’m talking to you as if you were a non-host, deluded into an idea of trust that to live a life is to shuffle records all day. And night.


Say what you will…but my job is DJing and whether you are of the opinion that I should shut up or whatever, I can only say that once uopn a time I’dl recognize the sign that’dl determine my existence by the parameters of the permanent vacation called DJing. This constitutes the acquired habit (some weird folks also call it commitment) to respond to my audience. Thus…wassup story listeners!

foYr: Autobiographical Injunction

Aye..yeah…Here…


Likewise…What kind of joy will your words bring to my and our acqantancies’ ears…?


Inspired by the previously heard ranting, I thought I’d share this anecdote with you guys…


Nothing can be more welcome than that...So…?


Yeah…This  autobiographical extract from the memory of my grandfather on my mother’s side is about a shamanistic dream that my great grandma on my father’s side once had during an afternoon nap. To be more precise, in her dream she was sitting in the middle of the ruins of the ancient temple when the telephone rang. An unknown voice called to announce the end of the empire of the wrestlers who ruled for the sake of rugbism. It seriously disturbed my great grandma and forced her to stand up from the previously assumed sitting position and look around to try to find--in retrospect--the heralds of the event.This made the actual great grandma toss and turn in her comfortable bed, fighting the news coming from beyond the conscious. Some call it denial, but I’m not sure I’d subscribe to such a definition, for denial implies conscious awareness…Or something like that…Some kind of reality…Some say that even being consciously aware is the epitome of the unreal. Perhaps. As I agree with the previously shunned religious myths and all the nonsense related to faith, my vision of reality is shrinking…And so was my great grandma’s—both in the dream and outside of it. You may claim that she would have avoided all the trouble by NOT having answered the call, but rebЯta…davayte…ona sama kogda ta davnooo bill wrestlёrom I znaet chto takoE “rugbism.” Esli bi kto TO skazal ёÕ chto ne vse forms of that sportism odinakie, on bЫ smog spatЬ I ne volnovexevatcЯ ob mirovom kataklizmiчeskom prospecte. No, ona takжe bill шamansküm priestessoi. Voila! Ona RegledA at the apparatus thininkng that it was simultaneously announcing the collapse of everything she had been up to up to that point. How so very outdated…After she woke up and told me about the dream, she also said that part of her unconsious in the dream suspected that the voice was mine. Her Id, however, decisively refuted that idea. This left me with an identity of an unworthy suspect. It also savagely disabled a possibility of my entering this memory excerpt as a protagonist. So, I decided I’d just tell it how it was…


If any, my anxiety is that there’s no wonder. Or so you tell me, me phone-in contributor…I might have got it all wrong, being a nonexpert specializing in what serious participants in life and culture consider to be paid for being a self-centered turntablist…You tell me…If not, I’ll just treat myself with another tune and you’ll feel tremendous benefits from that V…Do we have somebody on the line to confirm or deny my words…?
: Hellyeah!
: iQue Pasa!
Can’t remember…I don’t believe in memory…I believe in identity created from the image of what I imagine it was like before…yesterday, for instance…But my imagination can stretch further in the past…then I imagine what it was like long before yesterday came…and my identity is being built…and my conviction that I am based on what I imagine to have been in the forgotten past is growing stronger…And I feel like I am more alive and all…The more convinced I am, the better for you…Because your atavistic shadows of the postmyth shock are thus fading and, consequently, you think of yourself as an increasingly lively person…or something like that…At times you wonder how reliable that basis for imagining is, but you’ll recover from suspicion…My image of nonexisting memory is embedded in something beyond you…So much for memory…As for the rest, unlike the previous contributors, I do not shun the faith myth because I do not have such word in the vocabulary of my mind. Long story short, nothing to shun…As far as science is concerned, my image of identity is disinterested…That leaves me with a vacation of an enactment. More precisely, I act as if I were an artistic philosopher preaching world politics…So, I act as if it were October 26th, 2=9. And I open my act asking a questION: What’s your favorite color?


-- New blue--Is the new red--Is the new green--Is the new white--Is the new black.

But it’s not what you wear… /  No, I know—it ‘s how you turn…Right / Is the new left.


What color!!! I am an enactment, wandering along shady allyes, strolling past estuary brooks, drinking smoke, inhaling bread, hearing flavors, touching nothingness…If smell could kill, I am dead every year in June when a linden-lined street embraces me with the supersaturated atomosphere of the poststarburst dispersal of sticky droplets…That imbudes in my mind a sense of floatful playfulness and I let the drops infuse in the float more of the congealed substance…This for my consciousness is what to some people is memory. They ususally say that my acts don’t pass for philosophizing art from the perspective of world-policy-preaching…But that’s because they don’t know how to breathe gelatinized plasma…Undercurrent…Underscoring…Underlying…something that no memory can make more alive than it is.
Sometimes, like this morning, when I wake up from the embrace of the presence in the dream, welcoming me into a new dawn, I see iron clouds in the sky. And I know it was going to be a wonderful day (contributing to the previously heard acquaintance’s vacation of an enactment, I act as if it were 25th November, 20=). Cheerio!

Six: A Question
Calling neither to rant about science, prophesize, nor shun a phunkie thing. The reason for calling is actually to ask if you ever go home i.e., spend time not working. If so, (a) What do you do? (b) Who do you talk to? (c) How does it feel?

Not an easy questION, ol’ fella. And I don’t think I can give you a straightforward answer, given certain specificities that complicate the references of your words, expressions, phrases, syntagmas, and sentences. Firstly, if by home you mean a physical place, then my answer’ld be:

Yes, I do sometimes leave my booth. But then, quite frequently I relax on the sofa, or, even sleep for a couple of hours dividing my sessions. Secondly, the notion of doing is extremely problematic for those who (like me good self) have two spinning records for kidneys, an impressive groove along the surface of the liver, and a pump of a sort where other humans have what they boast of calling a heart. So, I guess my answer’ld be: No, I hardly ever not DJ


The third parameter complicating our dialogue is the questION of talk. Specifically, if your idea of human communication is limited to phone-in talks, then I have to proudly confess that I’ve spent many an hour listening to inner voices of the partners in the conversation. This by no means diminishes the significance of the listeners of the Program. Quite the opposite. Finally, how does it feel? You are asking me. Figure it out, fella.
Pleasure participating. /  Same here.


I’m calling to testify my weariness too…It’s been quite a while since I was marked…labeled…if unofficially…you might say…accused, some would call it…dubbed a notorious exoticizer, appreciator of other cultural heritage, merely a self-indulgent exile. Simultaneously, my taste and interest in, for example, the music of Etrurian peasants have constantly been misinterpreted as arrogant neglect of the contemporary Tuscan scene. By analogy, my scorn for my own traditional Hasidic tradition has been argued to have been inspired by the Madness cover of “Israelites.” To this I can only answer by refuting the analogy based on one simple and logically worthy thought---that my main love for the modern Italian cuisine is founded in the fact that it (modern Italian food, i.e.) did emerge from the old Tuscan legacy, whereas the lineage between Madness and Israel holds no such a connection.  Secondly, I also find it wearisome that my true passion for broken beat narrative, hijacking metafiction, IS, despite all the seeming counterarguments, entwined with the tradition that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. However, I resolutely, decisively, and irrevocably deny the relationship between that kind of literary descent with what will have been created in eighty-first century. So much for excavating my reading  posthistorical  dystopian present some time from now on. The remaining part of my testimony, as I previously requested in the conversation with me-ms-ess-ta--DJ, will be read by that very person for the reason known to me and the ones that you will shortly familiarize your good selves with, as well. Specifically, the details of the life of the person who lies here and whose name was writ in smoke are too delicate and soulshaking for the holder of these memories to be conveyed in his or her own voice. With NO further ado, me-ms-ess-ta--DJ, the floor is yours…

Dear me-ms-ess-ta--DJ, it is my pleasure to share this, to me and hopefully other participants in the Program, invaluable experience and provide a kind of testimony of the years spent in search for something that some call purpose, others meaning, some say it’s the absence of whatever the former would propose as a candidate for signification…and I just…choose…well…to write…The specific situation of a person diagnosed with a viral disease (that some mistakenly--and confusedly for that matter—think is contegious and infectious and, therefore, curable by the magical power of chemical speech) prevents me from physically participating in many a social event. Needless to say, that severely limits my inner world by simply restricting the number and kind of the persons that I’ve been in touch with. It, on the one hand, makes my world somewhat deserted; on the other, it broadens and deepens  my breath and makes my thought clearer. Not to mention the benefits my imagination draws from it. Thus, it could be said that it affects my creative potential to the extent and in the form ungraspable to those complicit in shaping the scope of my world. It is also worth noting that scale should by no means be equated with content and unpredictability of the ways it is being generated. But to elucidate the present moment, let’s excavate what it will-have-may-could-potentially-whatever-MUSTBE.












Sunday, May 6, 2012

During a Surgical Intervention: A Case Study






In mysterious corridors, endless bookshelves ornament the walls of the ancient building. Databases are its impalpable decor. Silence, looming above the minds immersed in the texts as versatile as they get, is saturated with pondering whose vehemence can only be compared with the pounding of an infant’s skull on the pulsating membrane of the placenta. Thoughts have weight here. They are hanging from the ceiling…brooding thoughts are looking at their own generator. A jungle of neurotransmitters’ electrifying trajectories. Galaxies full of orbits of unpredictable movements. Pulverizing impenetrability of riddled strings of words. Infinitely puzzling. Infinitely secretive. Endless strings of words. In books. In the book.
In one’s surgical adventures, Name uses sharp-edged tools in order to remove alien tissue darkly attached to the hidden bends on the soft  inside of one’s cranium. Faced with one’s hand reaching for the goodies from the collection of what to a more aesthetically inclined eye may look as curved, crooked, metal devices of astonishing delicacy…sinuous artistry…For Name, however, they are just surgical tools—for digging the archive. Here’s what Name’s dug:
How political is political? There is no description of the future dystopian enough to be scary of. True. Because no such a description depicts an unlived historical moment. A poetic expression is a process through which the mind propagates thoughts and images, all the while transforming itself into a modified version of its original condition, fertilizing the soil for the next occurrence of a metaphor harvest. For example, the situation in which a subject, or, a character is seated in a room that separates one from the scenery (evidently so appealing to oneself) is clearly meant to symbolize the predicament humanity was faced with in the postrenaissance era. More precisely, the increasing polarization between the mind and the body—not to mention the soul—was proportionate with the degree of the human innerness being torn between the urge to think and a simultaneous impulse to physically exist.
Somewhere in the semilost debris of what had been regarded as an inherent trait was a halfmuted cry for something that had to do with belief. Arguably, the split resulted from a serious (some would even characterize it as soul-shaking, but one needs not use jargon-free tools to negotiate theorizing), unprecedented shifts in the ways the society was structured and, more importantly perhaps, the modes of an individual’s positioning in the restructured world. To elucidate the point, we will briefly consider the rise of the industrialist culture rendering identity definable in monetary, rather than cosmic terms. In particular, the revision of the social and private alike went from the dismissal of the Great Chain of Being to embracing the great order of producing. Reducing a person to a laborer—exploited to death—had a devastating effect on one’s experience of the inner space as much as it forever changed human understanding of societal institutions. The overall impression of an individual inhabiting such a new world was that of incorrigible hostility.
An exposé  of this new social situation was provided by the eminent theoretician of the post-Great-Chain-of-Being culture by the name of George Turner. In his most recent study Looking and Being Looked at (2045), quite in accord with his previous theorizing, Turner delivers an explanation casting light on the condition in which the humanity experienced something that would linger on for the next couple of centuries--a dark cloud over civilization sewing a seed of what was believed to be an irrecoverable sense of inexplicable anxiety. He claims that not only a major aspect of human existence was profoundly shaken, but that it practically disappeared (51). Discarding religious vocabularies from the specter of descriptive tools, in Turner’s opinion, was a major contribution to phantom theorizing. Strangely, one may argue, the discharge of insufficiently factitious descriptions of the world and evidence-free cosmologies, brought to man’s chest another kind of burden: an irreconcilable states of having certain experiences and the inability to talk about them.
Although widely accepted as a plausible, historically informed take on post-Great societies, Turner’s speculative apparatus features potentially flawed argumentative maneuvering. As is convincingly explicated in The Comprehensive Guide through the Allegedly Phantom Culture (2050) by Larsønae Emoęn, Looking and Being Looked at impartially succeeds in rationalizing the complexities of the newly arisen social structure, inner turmoil, and theoretical tribulations. Vital to Emoęn’s critique is a lucid insight into Turner’s falling short of giving a more elaborate defense of his views, thereby finding himself faced with the caveat that he is thematizing. The paradox of such a theoretical impasse is further brought to the reader’s attention in what can be regarded as the thesis of this impressive work of Emoęn’s:
To say that a certain way of experiencing the world persisted after tectonic social movements changed both how we realize our communal being and the modes of talking about them is to lose one’s theoretical threat in the foggy realm of the irrational, that peculiarly existed and did not at the same time; to track the civilization’s unease through the scary, untrodden woods of the lost world is to speak the language that cannot tell whether one intended to be a flash in the obscurity of  thought.  (721)
To sum up, given these divergent, yet highly regarded and utterly informative views, we can say that to sit does not necessitate cognitive engagement, although such an office is by no means excluded from the range of human capacities in such a situation. To break the spell of crypticity, let’s point out the fact that if seated in an unmoving position long enough, the body experiences kinetic energy equal to the force developed by a spaceship at the moment before it starts landing. True. It is to realize the paradoxical dynamic of extremes: poverty and wealth, when manifested in their respective radical forms, both have an astonishingly detrimental effect on the human soul, heart, and body. Furthermore, to cognate seemingly inhibits the forces that can reach the fruition of the prevailing attempt to live freed from the threat of amputation. It is to watch behind the window pane and be focused on the sill. It is to dissolve oneself in the burning ocean of the blueness that no glass can keep distant enough from a mind’s grasp. It is to be colored in the shades of mixture that no space can keep contain, or, prevent sparkles from spraying up. It is to live whosever dream without feeling slightest fear that it can do something to the innermost smile.
By Way of a Social Commentary
Deep chasms of the privileged compartment of the Truth in the faculty of poetry was soon to be discovered and classified as poetics of oblivion. Overpoeticized and rhapsodic interpretations of reality were to be shunned as inappropriate representations of what really constituted human life. The anxiety shaking one’s positioning in the ever growing web of societal categories was to be questioned from the perspective of the validity of the vocabulary utilized for talking about such a state of affairs. Far from claiming that existential concerns were no longer being expressed through the language of poetry, this article aims to show the shift in narrative devices that in a much-more-to-the-ground manner told stories about what it meant to be human and  alive at a certain point in history. The pillar of the argument is the idea that the establishment of social institutions, paralleling the reinforcement of a particular policy on what is nowadays called global plane, reconfigured power relations classwise in the way that gave rise to the voices of the overexploited as much as it was a playground for the overprivileged to contemplate upon and reaffirm their social positioning. So restructured social relations were impossible, to say the least, to be expressed in a poetic vernacular; instead, a new, prose vocabulary was launched as a fresh means of telling the world about how it felt to be part of it.
In her revolutionizing study about the social and literary phenomena in question titled Why We Still Long for the Impossible Naivety of the Times Bygone  (2047) Channa Kerrion exposes to the reader a notorious truth about the importance of refocusing on the poetics of the everyday and the magnificent powers of the typically downplayed mundane language of the prose that depicts a historical moment. S/he stresses the much ignored fact about the potency of the language of an ordinary man pushed to the margins of existence through the severely broadened gap between the overprivileged and the underprivileged in the orbit of monetary ideology:
Once man found himself stripped to the basic ingredients of what would have otherwise been called life, s/he came to fully realize the fatality of the development caused by the growth of certain social strata. Poverty was firmly established as a cultural category determining man’s identity. That fact forever changed the way man experienced himself; it also undoubtedly altered the possibilities of readwriting about the new existential situation. (1)
The new possibilities Kerrion has in mind can be found in the rich literary legacy left for us from that period. It is small wonder that they still inspire our linguistic curiosity about the nuances of everyday language and awake the sentiment directing it towards seeking the secret that enabled big social truths to be revealed through such simple narrative devices. To illustrate the point, one is, time and again, drawn to the example found in the literary treasure chest from that period. A section from the novel Life and Love as They Are Imagined by the Rich to Be Lived by the Poor (3077) by Sannuu Dation is an instance of such an idiosyncratic subtlety:
S/he stood by the window. S/he was sitting in the armchair, waiting for her final decision: now was the moment when their destiny was to be determined by a simple Yes, once and for all freeing them both from the respective predicaments. If s/he agreed to marry him, his identity would forever change from that of a harshly impoverished factory worker to a member of country gentry. For her, it would be a passport to a promised land that disposes humiliation or bigotry as surrogate keys to family psychodynamics. (615)
This passage evidences simplicity of a literary expression, clarity of the train of thought, purity of genre, and crystalline nature of emotions. It also bears witness to deeply depressing social realities, from which naivety emerges as an extraordinary power reflected in the world of the letters. It is due to the  preservation of that sentiment that we are today still able to confront the escalation of social inequities and political vandalism, claims  Kerrion (130).

Anti-Ludites Culture: The World That Takes No Brains for Myths



The window, like a willow.
The eyes. I see with;
The space behind it—
Never to be spaetciousal enough.
Or, it really is?
Many a thought has so far been devoted to Alliana Nusraum’s coded, enigmatic language in her poem mystically titled “Is Really Or” (4040). Most interpretations literary theoreticians, critics, and literati by and large have based on the playful, yet eerie, relationship between the words denoting physical objects and the abstract nonobjectness suggested through their sparse presence. What singularly catches one’s attention is the concreteness of the opening: the juxtaposition of the animate with the inanimate prompts the mainline of the grist to Nusraum’s mill. The contrast between them is sharpened through the use of punctuation. However, other figures of speech—such as alliteration and simile—simultaneously bring these elements closer to each other. In her groundbreaking analysis Or. What Space. Is Never? (5501), Maergareth Olegalestic, the leading analyst of the culture of anti-ludites, characterizes this relationship as “edgy rubbing on a brink of softness” (202). The second line features assonance that enhances the repetitiveness of the audio component. It introduces phonetically the theme that is in the next line lexically realized. However, Nusraum rarely lets her verses speak up—the punctuation cuts the breath of the trope, defragmenting the potential unity. This “shallow breathing,” as it is sometimes called, is allegedly Nusraum’s poetic device suggesting the world’s suffocating and attempting to breathe again during a series of wars and the phunkie peace interrupting them. Further, the dash in the third line is not merely a reflection of the poetess’ inventive use of punctuation; it is a social commentary referencing the previous era and the prevalent implications of the social relations that characterized it. Finally, the word order in the closing line is deliberately bewildering, as it invites a question ignoring the traditional syntactic requirement for the subject/predicate inversion.
Jolly good and neat indeed. Name finds oneself reflecting on the portion of the dazzlingly critical mind, freed from emotional superfluousness. But lo! A pang in Name’s chest speaks up instead of one’s vocal apparatus: an article like the one from which Name has just read an excerpt betrays the spirit of the era it criticizes. Simply put, it is blasphemy of a sort, as it violates the very cornerstone of the new way in which the world of letters was being imagined. Particularly heretical is the observation about the dash—it introduces in the debate the social component absolutely unthinkable within the literary vocabulary of the anti-ludites culture. The rest of Nusraum’s analysis is seemingly in tune with the anti-ludites demand for poetic autonomy. Yet, it, essentially, leaves poetry in the backyard of its own house.
The way back to the house leads through unconscious memory of the future when the past pursuit was going to be accomplished as a secret code that obliges the reader to unveil the subject matter through the decrytoprocessor of one’s interpretative apparatus. Although adopted as an emotio-mental pattern, the mechanism gets domesticated so the host has no memory of not having had it as part of his or her biological being. What is more, the decryptoprocessor gets automatically activated when the one finds oneself faced with text of the approximately following content:
October 27th, 20X
I see you in the arm cut off and falling from where it used to be. Joined…attached to the shoulder. Its departure is an avalanche of gushing blood, torn tissue, broken bones, and spurting lymph. I am looking at what used to be the point of junction; now it is a howling crater fully prepared to devour…backwards…the lava of life…suck it into its depths…let it simmer the juices springing from its cradle…is processed and ready for another passage. Entering where the arm once was. And now is cut off.
Encountering the piece entitled “October 27th, 20X” by Anonymous, Seemrole Yock, the leading critic in the field of acquapatternism and director of the PostFestAfterWhat program at the Department of Retroimprovement, University of HowYesNo, provides the following account of his / her reading experience and presents the interpretation resulting from it. Professor Yock, along with the unavoidable, interpretative subtext, finds it necessary to consult the bible of acqapatternism—Myths, Holes, and South Roles (6442) by Barnara Cordhajmo. In the light of the theory discovered by Cordhajmo, the text becomes available for interpretative investigation when the first veil of the subtext deactivates its codebreaking disabler. Once the sine qua non is obtained, the process is set in motion. Cordhajmo claims that the first stage of reading, following deactivation of the disabler, happens while the reader is still perplexed by the impenetrability of the subject matter. Put differently, the first two stages of reading, actually, start in the crepuscular haze, reminiscent of the misty dawns of the days primordial.  Devoid of unnecessary, human-related burden of existence and reading, the contact with the text in the key of the desert  immemorial ensures purging of the interpretative channels from the noise of the autobiographical, socio-political, and/or isms of their ilk. Such purity of vision is another prerequisite for distilling from the text the radical essence.
Cordhajmo devises another angle from which to approach the language of the text in question. More precisely, s/he suggests that in order to impregnate the reading material with the imprinted code, the reader needs to inhale a significant amount of a haphazard mixture of linguistic patterns, hold it inside one’s verbal chamber for twenty-four seconds, and exhale it onto the surface of the text analyzed. By doing so, the organic concoction gets exchanged between the two poles of the communication tunnel. A matter of fact is that this infusion of the seemingly nontextual components, actually, dislocates the insipidness from the otherwise futile linguistic substance.
Myths, Holes, and South Roles further explicates the evolution of the reading process by exposing to the investigator the facticity of determination inherent to the nature of weaving the web of meaning. The most prominent aspect of that unshakable fact is revealed through innovative strategies of making the imprinted pattern visible to the interpreter, albeit not before the first unconscious and the second semiconscious stages are completed. Thus, with the beginning of the third phase, the reader starts applying reading tactics in the way typically perceived to be a creative discovery of meaning.
Terry Eagleton: “Surely life itself must have a say in that matter” (The Meaning of Life: A Very Short Introduction  67). Ken Wark: “The thing other than life through which life is thought can take one of three forms. One: life is spirit […] Two: life is time […] Three: life is form” (The Beach beneath the Street 97). What, then, is reading-writingWhat is storytelling? Providing a possible definitive answer to such question feels like a leap in the dark. But then, “[w]ithout the gamble on welcome, no door can be opened when freedom knocks” (George Steiner, Real Presences 156). 
For some writers literature is memory. For some it is the character. Some claim that the tone, or some other literary element, is what makes reading a literary experience. There are opinions that the decomposing corpse of the signature has conquered the everyday and became letters.  Many are prone to think that writing-reading occurs because there is nothing else to do. There are readers-writers who believe that storytelling is a dream’s reincarnate. For some writers beauty is what we make. Others think pleasure is who we are. Some, however, weave the unsayable fabric out of the fusion of the aforementioned threads. The fabric called the remix.[i]








[i] All pictures by the author. This essay, in a modified version and entitled "Nonprescriptive Narratives: Disruptions in Discourse, Wellspring of Words," was published in New Formalism Of/On The Contemporary, guest ed. Nicholas Birns. Spec. Issue of Pennsylvania Literary Journal 4.1 (2012).

Can It Be Beautiful, Or, Something: Says Who



How Big Is Political?


For some writers literature is history. For some it is norms. For others it is just about everything else. Or, so it seems:

Once upon a time, humanity realized that many individuals were increasingly withdrawing from the streets…into other universes: their rooms, skulls, echoes of somebody else’s words…At that point in history, humanity started compulsively thinking about the places where the soles touched the ground…and everybody was wondering if those places were good for laying their weary feet on the soil…nobody seemed to have an answer…The question was a shuttle-locomotive running from one ear to another, drawing ellipsoid orbits on the cracked inside of the crania… buildings were tumbling down outside…and there was no answer…because nobody knew where was what…or from…or who…

This essay explores certain aspects of the investment in creation. In order to elucidate the ways in which writing-reading resists ossification, vocabularies concerned with the character of  literature and culture are put in conversation. As a result, potentially illuminating insights are borne out of a fruitful oscillation between dissensus and agreement, between and amongst troublesome pairs: pleasure and normativity, inherent and culturally conditioned, individuality and communality, authorship and text, biography and hermeneutics, social plane and idiosyncratic intricacies, to name just a few. The ideas of T.S. Eliot, Richard Rorty, Paul de Man, Terry Eagleton, and McKenzie Wark are presented along with a metafictional case study to illustrate the supposedly clashing axes and demonstrate the unsayable as the language of the remix.
A perspective from which the abovesaid issues can be observed is the one concerned with the dialogue between formal literary features and their relation to extralinguistic realities. In that context, one is yet again faced with the necessity of avoiding reductionist portrayals of the encounter with a literary work. Neither cocooned, overprotected from and/or indifferent to the cultural, nor overdetermined by it seems to be the character of  writing-reading. Is that part of the way new formalism sees the activities occurring in the world of letters?
If new formalism is a return to aesthetics, then it’s right to implicitly indicate supremacist inclinations of certain vocabularies. It is probably even more accurate in defining the boundaries of the new movement by putting emphasis on the formality/formalism distinction. Moreover, balancing between the legacy of the new criticism and new historicism, new formalism rightly sees its potential territory in the marriage of beauty and activity. T.S. Eliot:” [W]hen a people is passive, may be torpor: when a people is quick and self-assertive, the result may be chaos” (“Unity and Diversity: Sect and Cult,” Notes towards the Definition of Culture 71). And chaotic it was. The new world that humanity saw the first half the twentieth century can surely be an explanation for the new critics’ insistence on a radical autonomy of literature, literary theory, and criticism. Today, one is prone to see the legacy in a remixed form, along the lines of Terry Eagleton’s thought:
From modernism proper, postmodernism inherits the fragmentary or schizoid self, but eradicates all critical distance from it…From the avant-garde, postmodernism takes the dissolution of art into social life, rejection of tradition, an opposition to ‘high’ culture as such, but crosses this with the unpolitical impulses of modernism […] An authentically political art in our own time might similarly draw upon both modernism and the avant-garde, but in a different combination from postmodernism. (“Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism,” Against the Grain: Essays 1975-1985, 146-7) 
However, one wonders how unpolitical is unpolitical, if understood in holistic terms the way Eliot did: ”Yet there is an aspect in which we can see a religion as the whole way of life of a people, from birth to the grave, from morning to night and even in sleep, and the way of life is also its culture” (“The Three Senses of Culture, ” Notes towards the Definition of Culture 31). The fragmented culture that is today taken for granted, if with different degrees of resistance, for Eliot and his contemporaries was alarming enough to inspire designing a platform from which to confront it: ”Culture may even be described as that which makes life worth living” (“The Three Senses of Culture,” Notes towards the Definition of Culture 27).
The first half of the twentieth century found the Western world bewildered by the newly emerged circumstances in which war, destruction, collapse of order, and eroded morality played crucial roles in shaping individual lives and socioscape alike. Strikingly differing from anything that humanity experienced before, the world was faced with a demand to respond to the novel realities. A devastating effect of The First and the Second World Wars exposed the reasons for profound suspicion about humanity and civilization. Individuals whose life heavily relied on creation felt particularly compelled to speak about it. Sometimes their voices were loud cries, sometimes shadow-talk.
Regardless of the tonal register, they were patently calls addressed to fellow-contemporaries. At times, those were embittered  laments; often, they were reanimating tactics. As a rule, they  acted as an injection of new blood in the humanity’s polluted body. In other words, those calls were mighty weapons of regaining human dignity through the power of creation against the acute aural infestation that invaded the intersubjectival web. Concomitant with that was the noise precluding clear vision from within. In response, fresh vocabularies are being devised. New realities demand new ways of speaking about  new experiences: “When the poem has been made, something new has happened, something that cannot be wholly explained by anything that went before. That, I believe, is what we mean by ‘creation’” (“The Frontiers of Criticism,” On Poetry and Poets 112).
Enduring Naming

In  “Literary History and Literary Modernity” from Blindness and Insight (1971), Paul de Man illustrates the dilemma resulting from a creative impulse. He centers the analysis around the clashing aspects of it, emphasizing the inevitability of fresh literary pieces’ being simultaneously self-interpreting  and interpretations of the existing texts:
The ambivalence of writing is such that it can be considered both an act and an interpretative process that follows after an act with which it cannot coincide. As such, it both affirms and denies its own nature or specificity. Unlike the historian, the writer remains so closely involved with action that he can never free himself of the temptation to destroy whatever stands between him and his deed, especially the temporal distance which makes him dependent on an earlier past. The appeal of modernity haunts all literature. (152)
Occasionally, literature responds to the appeal. Such attempts de Man sees as blindness of literature caused by “romantic disease,” (“Criticism and Crisis” 13) the haunting ghost of the romantic belief in poetry as the mirror of the world: “The fallacy of the belief that, in the language of poetry, sign and meaning can coincide, or at least be related to each other in the free and harmonious balance that we call beauty, is said to be a specifically romantic delusion” (“Criticism and Crisis” 12).
It might be a romantic delusion to believe that there is such correspondence, but the indefatigable reoccurrence of the appeal of immediacy is as an undisputable characteristic of literary fabric as is its mediating nature: “No true account of literary language can bypass this persistent temptation of literature to fulfill a single moment. The temptation of immediacy is constitutive of literary consciousness and has to be included in the definition of the specificity of literature” (“Literary History and Literary Modernity” 152). The mediatory dialectic creates a lacuna, revealing literature’s playing on the edge of the abyss, as if it were tending to substantialize the absence, the void. Such tendencies sustain an ongoing deferral of the cancellation of mediation: ”It is this possibility that constitutes the supreme wager; however, since it must remain wager, it is substance itself that is the abyss” (“The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism” 245). From this perspective, to create in a literary vernacular is to face the void and try to find the words to name the abysmal substance. As a relational vocabulary, literature is not capable of providing means for superseding the void. All literature can do is simply never stop naming: “Poetic language names this void with ever-renewed understanding and, like Rousseau’s longing, it never tires of naming it again. This persistent naming is what we call literature” (“Criticism and Crisis” 18).
De Man’s exploration of that naming is depicted through the reflections about the character of criticism in time of crisis in “Criticism and Crisis. Reflecting upon the tension between modernity and historicity of literary creation, de Man contrasts criticism to the disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, and philosophy to show their supremacist tendencies in the cultural arena.  Criticism, as a metavocabulary, questions and establishes  its own role, all the while resisting the dominance of other vocabularies. De Man positions criticism simultaneously scrutinizing the fabric of the faculty itself and the circumstances vital for its activation. Penetrating the layers underlying the reading-writing practice occurs in times of crisis, crucial for the existence of the discipline: “In the periods that are not periods of crisis, or in individuals bending on avoiding crisis at all costs, there can be all kinds of approaches to literature: historical, philosophical, psychological, etc., but there can be no criticism” (“Criticism and Crisis” 8).
From his other works, such as Critical Writings 1953-1978 (1989) and The Resistance to Theory (1986), it could be inferred that laying claims about the specificity of the literary-criticism axis results from contextualizing it historically within the web of diverse descriptions of the world. More precisely, it could be that the insistence on a certain autonomy of the language of literature and/or criticism comes as a response to the age-long role of philosophy as the mediator between the world and what is being said about it. With the historical paradigm shifts, this mediatory privilege was passed on to the realm of science and, it seems that de Man feels that through positivist legacy, the scientific paradigm is still felt as the vocabulary imposed on that of criticism. Since an “unmediated expression is a philosophical impossibility” (“Criticism and Crises,” Blindness and Insight  9), de Man designates the area of literature as an impossible territory to be explored—and demystified—philosophically.  McKenzie Wark: “But while one aspect of romanticism is otherworldly, an escape from this alien planet to one more hospitable, the symbols drawn from the total semantic field can also be brought back to the everyday. They can be lived” (The Beach beneath the Street 107).
If all comfort is to be found along the paths of theoretical art of mimicry, then all poetry is always already subtonically historicized.  If all genuinely mimicry-based theoretical art is always already justified by its imperfection, then its reality is either in its purposelessness or in its radically immutable variability. If  the glow projected from the torch is always already cast under sullenly tedious everydayness, the brutality of mundane immediacy is always historically theoretizable. DaerfoYr, it carries in itself potential for playing a role of the buffer between the dis-quiet buried deep in the mind’s engine and itself. As such, it is a chimera of its own doubling, while, in fact, it only acts as both—itself and a protection between itself and something else. Since the buffering territory is where one’s juggling gift finds its most fruitful justification, the chimera of doubling – i.e. double-role-playing immediacy of everyday experience – is also where nearly each subtonic pilgrimagist conjures up one’s way of researching the paths of the historical nature  of one’s artistry  and/or identity of a theoretico-poetrician.
 Names’n’Uses
 In accord with the antifoundational aspect of de Man’s thought, Richard Rorty, nonetheless, remarks in it traces of deterministic thinking, a sense of an essentialist apparatus, lurking from de Man’s reflections about literature and criticism.  In “De Man and the American Cultural Left” from  Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991), Rorty’s ironist reading, integrating latent psychoanalytic elements, focuses on the notion of longing in de Man’s explanation about poetic language as enduring naming of the void. From that angle, such drive is understood as desire that can never be satisfied: “the fact that language is a play of relations is just one more example of the more general fact that desire is, in its inmost nature, unsatisfiable” (131). To Rorty’s mind, this particular fact indicates essentialism in guise: “De Man should not turn essentialist at the last moment by claiming to have discovered such a nature” (131).
This complements Rorty’s reflections about the tension between theorizing and poeticizing discourses from Consequences of Pragmatism (1982). Admittedly, his own vocabulary is oxymoronically called postphilosophical philosophy. Such a position entails uneasy negotiations between private idiosyncrasies and communal rhetoric: “moral objection to textualism […] is also an objection to the literary culture’s isolation from common human concerns. It says that people like Nietzsche, Nabokov, Bloom, and Foucault achieve their effects at a moral cost which is too much to pay” (158). He confesses, however, that he has no discursive way to support the belief in the impossibility of translation between the public and the private, or between fantasy and theory. What could be called  the ironist dilemma is the implication of an antimetaphysical understanding of the world manifested in the irresolvable tension between the need to stand up for what is morally salient and inability to argumentatively defend one’s stance. Rorty focuses on the conversation between and among diverse vocabularies without proscribing a normativity for the dialogue:
Bloom’s way of dealing with texts preserves our sense of common human finitude by moving back and forth between the poet and his poem. Foucault’s way of dealing with texts is designed to eliminate the author – and indeed the very idea of “man” – altogether. I have no wish to defend Foucault’s inhumanism, and every wish  to praise Bloom’s sense of our common human lot. But I do not know how to back up this preference with argument, or even with the precise account of the relevant differences. (158)
Examining the new criticism, Rorty agrees with the claim that literature cannot reveal anything outside of itself (Consequences of Pragmatism 155). However, he disagrees with  prioritizing close reading as the method for textual analysis because claiming a method implies claiming an epistemology -- mimicking philosophy (156), thereby abandoning the model of an autonomous, revolutionary  vocabulary that establishes itself devising an authentic mode of speaking. Such attempts prevent poeticizing of culture, since they confine literature and literary to the realm of old vocabularies: “The weakest way to defend the plausible claim that literature has now displaced religion, science, and philosophy as the presiding discipline in our culture is by looking for a philosophical foundation for the practices of contemporary criticism” (155).
Rorty is contrasting the new criticism to the next historical occurrence of text-oriented antimetaphysical thought that focuses on nontranscendent/nontranscendental character of literature. This group of thinkers he calls textualists: ”[T]he so called ‘Yale school’ of literary criticism centering around Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartmann, J. Hillis Miller, and Paul de Man, ‘post-structuralist’ French thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, historians like Hayden White, and social scientists like Paul Rabinow” (139).  This school of thought Rorty considers to be genuinely modernist – it nonargumentatively introduced new forms of reading literature, neither proscribing a method, nor assigning to their activity the status of a privileged vocabulary. Consequently, their works epitomize Rorty’s perception of poeticized culture based on a new understanding of literature and meaning as creation, rather than discovery: “By ‘literature,’ then I shall mean the areas of culture which, quite self-consciously, forego agreement on an encompassing critical vocabulary, and thus forego argumentation” (142).
If all poetry happens in time, one moast always theorize. If theory reflects one’s meditative perception of the world, one moast not replicate the object of the metavocabulary. Even if one could. If theoryverse is a world in its own right, its reality is lived out through its closeness to itself. And, by extension, to reality. At bottom, the extension lies in its exegesis, i.e. in its originating from a meditative search for the buffer between the profound dis-quiet with the immediate everyday experience and the knowledge of a suspiciously empirical character buried in the heart of the mind’s engine. 




Poeticized Philosophy
In “Pragmatist Progress” (1992) Rorty further develops vision of nonargumentative writing, previously exposed in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982). Specifically, writing is presented as an act of creating meaning by different readers to different ends. Similarly, literary criticism is not understood as a practice of seeking for the hidden, real meaning of the text, because there is no such thing. Instead, there are as many meanings as there are uses of text within the process of knitting an intertextual, hybrid web of revised vocabularies from the past and of the present. This perspective delineates the contested boundaries of the activity called literary criticism:
 It [literary criticism] originally meant comparison and evaluation of plays, poems and novels – with perhaps an occasional glance at the visual arts. Then it got extended to cover past criticism […] Then, quite quickly, it got extended to the books which had supplied past critics with their critical vocabulary and were supplying present critics with theirs. This meant extending it to theology, philosophy, social theory, reformist political programs, and revolutionary manifestos. In short, it meant extending it to every book likely to provide candidates for a person`s final vocabulary (81).
Commenting on the revised notion of literary criticism, Rorty observes that the term cultural criticism would more accurately describe the actual practice. However, he notes that “literary” has, nevertheless, endured. Thus instead of renaming the term literary criticism, the notion of literature has changed:
It is a familiar fact that the term “literary criticism” has been stretched further and further in the course of our [the twentieth] century…This meant extending it to theology, philosophy, social theory, reformist political programs, and revolutionary manifestos. In short, it meant extending it to every book likely to provide candidates for a person`s final vocabulary […] So instead of changing the term “literary criticism” to something like “culture criticism,” we have instead stretched the word “literature” to cover whatever the literary critics criticize. (81)
Casting aside any immutable component of reading-writing, these fluid, dedivinized notions of literature and literary criticism enable a plurality of created meanings. In other words, instead of proving to have “the key to the door,” this antifoundationalist  approach to the world of letters is a revolutionary paradigmatic shift of cultural vocabulary:
This is what the literary culture has been doing recently, with great success. It is what science did when it replaced religion and what idealist philosophy did when it replaced science. Science did not demonstrate that religion was false, nor philosophy that science was merely phenomenal, nor can modernist literature or textual criticism demonstrate that the “metaphysics of presence” is an outdated genre. But each in turn has managed, without argument, to make its point. (Consequences of Pragmatism 155)
 Such shifts of paradigms Rorty sees as crucial for poeticizing of culture. Accordingly, radical examples of the revolutionary practice include Harold Bloom’s “strong misreading” and later Derrida -- “the period in which his writing becomes more eccentric, personal, and original”  (123).  In the essay “From Ironist Theory to Private Allusions: Derrida” in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Rorty  praises Derrida’s challenging the consensus about the supremacy of argumentative discourse, simultaneously confronting the domesticated private-public binary:
 I take Derrida’s importance to lie in his having had the courage to unite the private and the public, to stop trying to bring together a quest for private autonomy and an attempt at public resonance and utility. He privatizes the sublime, having learned from the fate of his predecessors that the public can never be more than beautiful. (125)
Similarly, de Man points out the potential of Derrida’s writing: “His text, as he puts it so
well, is the unmaking of a construct. However negative it may sound, deconstruction implies the possibility of rebuilding” (“The Rhetoric of Blindness,Blindness and Insight 140).  It is precisely Derrida’s belief in the limitless potential of literature that entails the idea of inexhaustible activity of creation.
Once upon a time humanity found itself plagued by lexical proliferation. The critical area of confusion happened to be the schizoid split within the term privacy. On the one hand, the meaning of the word got atomized through the replication, resulting in seemingly akin, yet, in fact, resolutely distinct concepts such as intimacy, individuality, identity. On the other hand, however, the fragmentation in question lead to an overwhelming sense of universality, contained in the interaction between and amongst the particularities at stake. The universality that, for some reason, felt unbearable. Unbearable for the counterintuitive clash between resemblance and differentiation. Counterintuitive because intuition presumes coincidence, resonance, and/or  convergence between logically discordant phenomena. Logically discordant because of the counterintuitive, a priori laws of logic. Counterintuitive because of the logic of negation of innate categories. Negation because of the facticity of the constructivist character of the mind. Constructivist because of the counterintuitive nature of the perception and meaning of the likes of color red as a stimulation of neurons, communication between transmitters and the rest of the nervous system, climaxing in the signal reaching the target in the central part of it, revealing to the remaining parts of the organism that the sensory input translates into Я-AE-D.


Dedivinizing Cultural Reshifting

Thus, is the world of letters solely discursive matter? If so, could it be granted autonomy, provided that cultural realities are discursively conditioned, as well? If not, can the world be free from cultural overdeterminism? Consequently, does it mean that one is not doomed to the deprivation of an idiosyncratic idiom? Can extraliguistic realities inform that who one is? In an age of peculiar pluralism, a double blessing enables voicing out diverse beliefs, simultaneously imposing boundaries on the vocabularies in which they are verbalized. Thus, one wonders how to resist oppression and express that what refuses to disappear: a sense that part of reading-writing might be creation of meaning haunts ceaseless explorations of literary fabric.
According Rorty, many supposedly revolutionary redescriptions of the vocabulary of culture have merely been shifts of the focus. For instance, the Enlightenment refocused human existence from God to science. Classical German Idealism denounced the language of science and argued that the vocabulary of philosophy being congruent with that of reality, while the Romantic poets shifted the focus from philosophy to poetry: “Kant and Hegel went only halfway in their repudiation of the idea that truth is ‘out there’[…] What was needed, and what the idealists were unable to envisage, was a repudiation of the very idea of anything – mind or matter, self or world – having an intrinsic nature to be expressed or represented” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 4).
Vital to the analysis is Rorty’s observation about the role of irony with regard to revolutionary vocabularies. More precisely, an ironist vocabulary does not strive to step outside the realm of the private and poeticized. Such an attempt leads to what is in Heideggerian terms called a metaphysical relapse. Just as Heidegger accuses Nietzsche of Platonism in disguise, Rorty criticizes Heidegger’s attempt to overcome metaphysics and all overcomings by introducing yet another capitalized notion – Being.
Analogously, Rorty claims that the Romantic poets partially redescribed the vocabulary of  culture of the nineteenth century. He sees the significance of Romanticism in its centering culture around a secular, albeit nonscientific, nonphilosophical vocabularies. Although a major contribution to a poeticized culture, Romantic irony is decisively distinct from liberal irony. While both imply radical playfulness, the former, based on Friedrich Schlegel’s thought in Lucinde and the Fragments (1971), is defined in terms of the absolute and necessity: “Irony is the freest of all licences, for by its means one transcends oneself; and it is also the most lawful, for it is absolutely necessary” (161). Additionally, it is concerned with concepts such as  infinity, the distinction between text and  reality, and the perception of poetry as representation: “In each of its representations / transcendental poetry should / also represent itself, and should always be both poetry and the poetry of poetry” (242).
            From the Romantic point of view, culture is poeticized because it is in poetry where the key that opens the door to the Truth can be found. Thus, in A Defence of Poetry (1910) Shelley claims that poets are “the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (233). However, despite sharing a common belief in poetry as the language connecting  microcosmic and macrocosmic voices, there were discrepancies among the Romantics  understandings of poetics. For instance, in Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge claims that truth has a polyvalent, instead of monolithic, character: “I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist.  I care not from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible” (89). However, he stresses an organic nature of poetry, implying traditional, metaphysical notions: “A legitimate poem[…]must be one the parts of which naturally support and explain each other” (172).  These contradictions make Rorty suspect that the irony in the Romantic poetry is not necessarily the same as the one he is offering as a descriptive strategy. He also finds it reasonable to believe that the Romantic and ironist worlds do not share the same vision of a poet as the central cultural hero — the latter is a dedivinized version of the former. This is reflected in his recapitulation of historical reshifting from religion to poetry via science and philosophy -- secular vocabularies reverberating with the sacredness they were trying to refute:
I can crudely sum up the story which historians like Blumenberg tell by saying that once upon a time we felt a need to worship something which lay beyond the visible world. Beginning in the seventeenth century we tried to substitute a love of truth for a love of God, treating the world described by science as a quasi divinity. Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century we tried to substitute a love of ourselves for a love of a scientific truth, a worship of our own deep spiritual or poetic nature, treated as one more quasi divinity. (22)

Dead Words
Nonargumentative, poeticized uses of text can, thus, be perceived as restorative deconstructionist naming of the void. Within such a redescription of the notion of literature, theory, and criticism, one wonders whatever happened to culture. Building on Eagleton’s  aesthetico-political reconfiguration of the twentieth century vocabularies, the remix might be sketched along the following lines: (a) The novel, pertinent to creative practices is what one adopts from the avant-garde uncompromising uprooting; yet, one keeps the awareness of having his or her vocabulary, to different degrees, inspired by  traditional ones--only remixed; (b) Fragmentary consciousness that modernists made apparent is, unfortunately, part of the realities one inhabits today; that, however, does not mean that one is doomed to insanity; (c) Apolitical preservation of the autonomy of creation is an integral part of the ultimate dream of freedom; this  by no means prevents one from finding ways of juggling these two seemingly incompatible vocabularies (aesthetic and political, i.e.).
But how political is it? How aesthetic? How formalist? Or, how pleasurable, for that matter, in an age of uncertainty, when nobody knows whether the author is dead, or, whose voice it is that one utters sentences in. Fredric Jameson: [T]he end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal, the end of the distinctive brush stroke” (Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 15). Analyzing architecture, Jameson claims that the human subject has not kept pace with the mutations of the object, in which a new space – hyperspace - has been created, and for which one simply does not have appropriate perceptual habits. In other words, there has not been a mutation on behalf of the subject equivalent and accompanying that of the object.
The subject’s apparent lagging behind the advancement of the object can be understood as a consequence of the supposedly atrophying constituents, affect and style/signature being among them.  In a word, incongruence between the object and the subject in contemporary world is commonly understood as a result of the subject’s inability to follow the changes happening on the level of the object. However, it turns out that the subject is not all that disabled. And that what adds up to its idiosyncratic character (style/signature, for example) seems to be alive and well. More precisely, unlike in hyperspace, for an entity of a different shape, such as the style/signature, the subject does have a corresponding perceptual apparatus: a response is not missing. Thus, the death of the style/signature seems to be a make-believe reality that resulted from the fear of the loss of authenticity. Or, the fear of authenticity not being lost. If the former is the case, one mistakenly believed that what one feared would happen, actually, did happen. If the latter, one was misled to believe that something disastrous would happen, should have such a nightmare come true.  
Consequently, one lived a delusion of a deprivation of uniqueness, whereas death of the style actually never occurred. Even prototypically inauthentic postmodernist works speak in an unmistakably unique voice. Even those who dismiss the myth of originality create an idiosyncratic vernacular. Even those who decisively defer authenticity are quite unlikely to be mistaken for somebody else’s voice. Fredric Jameson:”[P]ostmodernism, despite its systematic and thoroughgoing rejection of all the features it could identify with high modernism and modernism proper, seems utterly unable to divest itself of this final requirement of originality” (Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present 152). One would be prone to say that whoever cares about authenticity and the related issues and expresses one’s concerns about them--regardless of the perspective--unavoidably does so in an idiosyncratic idiom.
            Therefore, death of the style/signature is, essentially, what makes postmodernist a culture of and/or discourse of denial. The proclamation of the alleged death comprises of a crass understatement, or, an overstatement about the life of the subject. Postmodernists are right to inherit a broken image of reality from modernists. However, such a picture should remain communicable or else the polyphony is merely a simultaneity of individual, disjoined cacophonic noise, disinterested in and immune to redemption. If this were the case, the adjective individual should not be mistakenly understood to be the stem for the derivation of the noun individuality, but rather of individualism. Further, postmodernists are right to claim that there are as many descriptions as there are idiosyncratic idioms, but this truth does not entail a presumption that all of them are tenable. Finally, postmodernists are right to believe in inauthenticity not because its opposite is untrue, but because a replica is an impossibility.
Along with the death of the subject, author, self, style, uniqueness, totality, postmodernism claims the death of history. In The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998 (1998), Jameson challenges it: “But the notion of the ‘end of history’ also expresses a blockage of the historical imagination” (91). Similarly, other blockages preclude other kinds of imagination. For example, the imposition of the supposed multiple deaths overshadows the theoretical imagination--the right to remix and see the signature/style and solidarity as compatible. Impositions of that kind attempt to persuade one that something dreadful will happen to cultural polyphony if one lives one’s uniqueness. It aspires to overthrow one’s belief that, actually, there is nothing wrong with the subjects’ being individuals. And alive.
Such impositions threaten the creative imagination and the potential of the textual. Since the literature of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries has to a large extent been self-reflective, it has also been a form of denial of its potential and a delusion about its dead-end. In response to that, non-existent, inauthentic voices are heard as a call for reanimation of the tired body of literature and supposedly nonexisting readers/writers—subjects. Human, at that. Well, stories, to be sure, must have a say in that matter. [i]








[i] All pictures by the author. This essay, in a modified version and entitled "Nonprescriptive Narratives: Disruptions in Discourse, Wellspring of Words," was published in New Formalism Of/On The Contemporary, guest ed. Nicholas Birns. Spec. Issue of Pennsylvania Literary Journal 4.1 (2012).